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I. TRODUCTION
In response to the "slow but relentless deterioration" in the state of the
environment, the European Union (EU) is considering a system of civil liability
to finance the cleanup of environmental damage.' During 1993, the EU
Commission circulated a discussion document known as the Green Paper' on
Remedying Environmental Damage (Green Paper).3 The Green Paper, a
communication from the EU Commission to the Council of Ministers and
Parliament, discusses the usefulness of civil liability to remedy environmental
damage and finance its cleanup.4 The recommendation, which remained open for
discussion through October 1993, is similar to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) enacted in the United
States.' CERCLA holds responsible parties strictly liable for environmental
damage.' Following the enactment of CERCLA in 1980, U.S. lenders faced
environmental liability as "owners and operators" of contaminated property.
7
European financial institutions, aware of the liability concerns facing lenders in
1. EU Environment Commissioner Ioannis Palcokrassas, Address Before the European Parliament
Regarding the Green Paper in Brussels, Belgium (Nov. 3, 1993), in Reuter Eur. Community Rep., Nov. 3, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reueub File. On November 1, 1993, the former European Community (EC)
became known as the European Union (EU). European Union, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1993, at 15. Since the author
is uncertain whether the former EC organizations have altered their names to reflect the EU name change, this
comment refers to EC organizations by their previously recognized titles.
2. A Green Paper concentrates interest in a particular area and is used in preparing legislation. EC-EC
Environmental Liability Legislation, MARKET REP., Aug. 17, 1993.
3. Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage COM(93) 47, Mar. 1993 [hereinafter Green
Paper]; EC Dives into Environmental Liability Debate, EC ENERGY MONTHLY, Sept. 16, 1993. The EU
Environment Commissioner loannis Paleokrassas declared the development of an environmental, civil liability
system to be a priority in 1994. The Week in Europe: Aid for Britain's Jobless, PRESs Ass'N NEWSPILE, Jan.
20, 1994.
4. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.0; Environment, EC Commentaries (Coopers & Lybrand) (Mar. 3,
1994) available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurscp File (discussing the civil liability proposal in the Green Paper),
Chris Napier, World: Paying Out for Pollution-EC Green Paper Opens Debate with Insurers, REACTIONS, July
1, 1993 (discussing the community-wide system of civil liability approach of the Green Paper). See infra notes
26-29 and accompanying text (explaining the Commission, Parliament, and Council of Ministers).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994); Green Paper, supra note 3, § 4.1.2. Similar to the strict liability scheme
employed in the United States under CERCLA, the Green Paper examines the advantages of a strict liability
system for remedying environmental damage in the EU. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 4.1.2.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994). CERCLA consists of environmental legislation in the United States which
holds "owner[s] and operator[s]" of "vessel[s] or facilit[ies]" liable for damage to natural resources and cleanup
costs as the result of such damage. Id. See infra notes 66-98 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of
CERCLA on financial institutions); infra notes 159-79 and accompanying text (examining the civil liability
system expounded in the Green Paper).
7. See infra notes 66-98 and accompanying text (discussing lender liability under CERCLA).
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the United States, fear being held strictly liable under the proposed environmental
legislation in the European Union. 8
Concerned parties in the European Union, particularly bankers, carefully
follow lender liability issues in the United States in order to anticipate events
under similar EU legislation.9 The Banking Federation of the European
Community (BFEC) has expressed concern over potential lender liability. The
BFEC is particularly apprehensive about acquiring the responsibility of policing
borrower behavior in order to prevent their own liability for environmental
damage.10
European industries have also expressed discontent with the establishment of
a civil liability system similar to CERCLA legislation.1 The European gas and
electricity lobbyists and the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations
of Europe (UNICE) have registered discontent with the U.S. civil liability system
under CERCLA."2 However, European environmental leaders appreciate the
value of examining the civil liability system in the United States. 3 The U.K.
environmental minister and the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium
advocate reviewing the benefits of CERCLA while averting the repercussions of
8. Lender Liability, FIN. Tnsss, Mar. 13, 1992. Banks fear that they will be held liable as owners
operators or deemed producers under environmental legislation. Id. See EC Dives into Environmental Liability
Debate, supra note 3 (noting that European policy makers consider the U.S. Superfund experience); Emerging
Issues: A Crisis Looms, Bus. INT'L MONEY REp., June 14, 1993 (noting that many European entities carefully
follow U.S. cleanup expenditures).
9. Emerging Issues: A Crisis Looms, supra note 8 (noting that many European entities carefully follow
environmental spending in the United States).
10. Environment: First Clash of Swords in Liability Debate, Multinat'l Serv. (Eur. Info. Serv.), Nov. 20,
1993 available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter First Class] (announcing the Banking
Federation's concern about environmental liability). The Banking Federation wishes to limit lender involvement
in environmental cleanup to the general monitoring of client activities. Id. The Banking Federation of the
European Economic Community (BFEC) represents the interests of banking associations in the EU and the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
25 (Grant J. Eldridge ed., 28th ed. 1993).
11. First Clash, supra note 10. The chemical industry and the European Federation of Waste Management
have expressed discontent specifically with CERCLA's civil liability scheme. Id. The International Chamber of
Commerce, the insurance industry, and the banking industry have expressed general discontent with a civil
liability scheme. Id.
12. Gas, Power Sectors Take Hard Line on Environmental Liability, FLIGHT INT'L, Oct. 21, 1993; UNICE
Expresses Strong Opposition, FLIGHT INT'L, Oct. 21, 1993. Gas and electricity lobby groups negatively view
Superfund because of the tremendous resources that are expended in identifying polluters. Gas, Power Sectors
Take Hard Line on Environmental Liability, supra. UNICE argues that only the party controlling the activity
causing the damage should be held responsible for the damage. UNICE Expresses Strong Opposition, supra.
Additionally, the UNICE believes that financial institutions which do not participate in decisions which lead to
environmental damage should not be held liable. Id.
13. AmCham Draws US Lessons, FLIGHT INT'L, Oct. 1993 (noting the support for an examination of the
experience under Superfund by the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium (AmCham)); Opening Volleys,
FLIGHT INT'L, Oct. 1993 (quoting U.K. environmental minister's recognition of the positive benefits of
Superfund).
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sweeping civil liability.14 Since the Green Paper recognizes the importance of
addressing the detrimental effects of civil liability, particularly the consequences
facing the lending industry, 5 it is helpful to analyze the effects of civil liability
on U.S. lenders under CERCLA.
By examining the experience of lenders and financial institutions under
CERCLA, EU lenders can avoid repeating the miscalculations of U.S. lenders.'
6
Following a federal appellate court decision which broadly interpreted the security
interest exemption under CERCLA, lenders began to confront uncertain
environmental liability.17 In order to alleviate potential liability, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) drafted a rule clarifying the security interest
exemption under CERCLA. t8 The EPA's clarification has created a safe haven
for lenders facing liability under CERCLA. 9
This comment explores liability issues that EU lending institutions will face
if the EU adopts CERCLA-like civil liability legislation. Part II discusses the
origins of environmental legislation in the EU and examines the European
stimulus for environmental legislation." Part Im reviews the U.S. approach to
civil liability under CERCLA, the effect of case law, and the administrative
response.2 Part IV previews the forthcoming EU system of civil liability as
pronounced in the Green Paper and addresses the detrimental consequences of
14. AmCham Draws US Lessons, supra note 13; Opening Volleys, supra note 13. U.K. Environmental
Minister Tim Yeo called for recognition of Superfund success in prevention of environmental damage. Opening
Volleys, supra note 13. The EU Committee of AmCham also notes that it is important to recognize the
advantages of comprehensive environmental legislation while avoiding the "overly broad liability system."
AmCham Draws US Lessons, supra note 13.
15. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 4.1.2 (recognizing the need to consider how financial institutions will
be affected by a system of strict liability).
16. See AmCham Draws US Lessons, supra note 13. The EU Committee of AmCham examines the EU
position on civil liability in light of the U.S. experience under Superfund. Id. See notes 13-14 (describing
AmCham). U.K. Environmental Minister Tim Yeo calls for recognition of the positive benefits of Superfund,
including the effectiveness of deterring further contamination. Opening Volleys, supra note 13.
17. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (1Ith Cir. 1990). Liability for cleanup costs
is based on the lender's capacity to influence hazardous waste decisions. Id. See Peter N. Lavalette, Comment,
The Security Interest Exemption Under CERCLA: Timely Relief from the EPA, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 473, 475
(1993) (stating that the lending community faces uncertain and controversial exposure to liability since Fleet
Factors); Michael I. Greenberg & David M. Shaw, Note, To Lend or Not to Lend-That Should Not Be the
Question: The Uncertainties of Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 41 DuKE LJ. 1211, 1211-12 (1992) (noting
that lender uncertainty is the result of differing interpretations of the security interest exemption under
CERCLA); infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text (reviewing United States v. Fleet Factors).
18. National Oil Hazardous Waste Substance Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability Under
CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (codified as 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1100, 300.1105 (1992)); Lavalette, supra
note 17, at 508 (noting that the EPA regulations offer guidance to lenders to avoid liability under CERCLA).
See infra note 103 (noting that the EPA rule has been invalidated by the D.C. Circuit Court).
19. National Oil and Hazardous Waste Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability Under
CERCLA, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1100, 300.1105 (1992). See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,348-74 (1992) (discussing the
promulgation of the EPA clarification of the secured creditor exemption); Lavalette, supra note 17, at 487-92
(reviewing the EPA rule); infra notes 99-136 accompanying text (discussing the EPA rule).
20. See infra notes 24-65 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 66-162 and accompanying text.
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lender liability.' Finally, part V recommends that European lenders undertake
certain precautions to reduce the possibility of environmental liability during the
uncertain period before and shortly after the enactment of environmental, civil
liability legislation.3
II. RECENT TRENDS IN EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. EU Background
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty) gave birth to the idea of a
common market among European countries. 24 The EEC Treaty remains
fundamentally intact, although subsequent legislation has amended it.2 Three
institutions are authorized under the EEC Treaty to participate in the legislative
process in the EU: the Commission, Council of Ministers, and European
Parliament.26 The Commission initiates legislative proposals and implements EU
law,27 while the Council of Ministers reviews Commission proposals and
prescribes EU law based on these proposals.28 Additionally, the European
Parliament aids in the decision-making authority of the Council by commenting
on Commission proposals before a final decision is made by the Council. 29
While the original EEC Treaty contained no provisions regarding the environ-
ment, the Single European Act (SEA)3" amended the EEC Treaty to include
environmental legislation.3"
22. See infra notes 163-91 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 192-228 and accompanying text.
24. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter
EEC Treaty]. Two other treaties were also involved in the establishment of an European Union: the Treaty
Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom); however, the EEC Treaty was the instrumental device in the move toward a
common market. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 295 U.N.T.S.
259; Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
25. P.S.R.F. MATHuSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 2 (5th ed. 1990) (noting Single
European Act, Merger Treaty, and Act regarding direct elections for European Parliament are among the several
acts which have amended the original treaty). A comprehensive list of amending treaties acts may be found in
the table of "abbreviations used in footnotes" reproduced prior to the text of the EEC Treaty at 2 B.D.I.E.L.
(CCH) 45 (1989).
26. EEC Treaty, supra note 24, arts. 137, 145, 157.
27. THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTInU, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DESKBOOK 4 (1992) [hereinafter
DEsKBoOK]; JOHN PAXTON, A DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 44 (1977).
28. DESKBOOK, supra note 27, at 4; PAXTON, supra note 27, at 58.
29. DESKBOOK, supra note 27, at 4; PAXTON, supra note 27, at 58.
30. Single European Act, July 1, 1987, 30 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. 169) 1 (1987). See Mark L. Jones,
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Introduction and Bibliography, 2
B.D.I.E.L. (CCH) 3 (1989) (stating that the slow pace of integration led to the adoption of the SEA).
31. EEC Treaty, supra note 24, art. 130r, Thomas R. Mounteer, Proposed European Community Directive
for Damage to the Environment Caused by Waste, 23 ENvTL. L. 107, 111 (1993) (discussing the adoption of
environmental provisions in the EU). The EEC Treaty requires that all EU actions "shall be based on principles
that preventative action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at [its]
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Similar to the U.S. judicial interpretation of CERCLA, the SEA amendments
embodied a "polluter should pay" principle.3" Following the mandate of the EEC
Treaty, the Commission considered the merits of civil liability to implement this
principle.33 The Green Paper evaluates the usefulness of both strict and fault
liability regimes to remedy environmental damage.3 Although the EEC Treaty
permits member states to adopt more stringent environmental standards, the Green
Paper acknowledges that differing standards among member states may result in
"distortions of competition" in the single market.35 Uniform environmental
legislation will alleviate competition distortions between member states.36
Beyond the need for uniform legislation, the Commission was also motivated by
public demand for a system of environmental accountability, a pledge by the
Council of Ministers to draft environmental legislation, and a similar draft
Convention on environmental liability by the Council of Europe. 7 In March
1993, the Coifimission delivered the Green Paper to the Council and Parlia-
ment.38 The Commission recommended the adoption of a strict, civil liability
standard supplemented with a system of joint compensation.39
source, and the polluter should pay." EEC Treaty, supra note 24, art. 130r. See MATHUSEN, supra note 25, at
275-76 (reviewing environmental legislation in the EU).
32. EEC Treaty, supra note 24, art. 130r; Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.0. CERCLA mandates that
parties responsible for environmental damage finance the cost of cleanup. United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp.
1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
33. Green Paper, supra note 3.
34. Id. § 2.1. "[Civil liability] was developed to cover situations where it was more just to make the
person responsible for the act or incident causing the damage to bear the consequent costs .... Id.
35. EEC Treaty, supra note 24, art. 130t; Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.0. "The protective measures
adopted ... shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective
measures compatible with this Treaty." EEC Treaty, supra note 24, art. 130t.
36. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.0. EU Environment Commissioner loannis Paleokrassas notes that
environmental legislation promulgated at the national level will create differences in extent and amount of
liability between member states. Paleokrassas Outlines Views on Environmental Liability Debate, EC ENERGY
MONTHLY, Nov. 19, 1993 [hereinafter Paleokrassas Outlines].
37. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.0. See infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text (discussing the
Council of Europe's Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment).
38. Green Paper, supra note 3. During a five month discussion period, the Commission accepted over
100 comments from interested parties and organizations. Paleokrassas, supra note 1. See infra notes 159-76 and
accompanying text (examining the civil liability system proposed in the Green Paper).
39. Green Paper, supra note 3. See infra notes 159-76 and accompanying text (examining the Green
Paper).
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B. European Environmental Legislation
1. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from
Activities Dangerous to the Environment
Environmental action by the Council of Europe precipitated the development
of the Green Paper.4' The Council of Europe is an entirely distinct body from
the EU and should not be confused with any of the EU branches: the Commis-
sion, Council of Ministers, or Parliament.41 Formed in 1948, the Council of
Europe promotes political and military integration in Europe.42 Although many
of its economic proposals have been superseded by EU action, the Council of
Europe has made advances in the human fights arena.43 One commentator has
noted that the Council of Europe "provides a forum for cultural and political
contacts extending beyond membership in the EU and so preserves the concept
of European unity."'
In June 1993, seven European countries signed the Council of Europe's
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous
to the Environment (Convention).45 The Convention holds operators liable for
injury to property, persons, or the environment when the operator conducts
activities dangerous to the environment. 6 The Convention exempts operators
who can prove a force majeure,47 intervening third-party acts, or compliance
with the public authority regulations. 8
40. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.0. The Commission began to consider an environmental protection
system of liability because the Council of Europe and other international organizations are establishing liability
schemes. Id.
41. Members of the Council of Europe include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Kellee A. Brown & Sophia A.
Muirhead, Extradition: Divergent Trends in International Cooperation, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 223, 234 n.72
(1992). The members of the European Union include Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Republic of Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ASSOCIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION supra note 10.
42. D. LAsoK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 9-10
(4th ed. 1987); PAXTON, supra note 27, at 55-57 (discussing the Council of Europe).
43. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 42, at 9-10; PAXTON, supra note 27, at 55-57 (discussing the Council
of Europe),
44. PAXTON, supra note 27, at 55-57 (discussing the Council of Europe).
45. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment,
SEC(91) 750 final (adopted on Mar. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Convention]. Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Finland, and the Netherlands signed the Convention on June 21, 1993. Environment, supra note
4; Environment: Seven States Sign Civil Liability Convention Europe Energy, EUR. ENERGY, July 9, 1993, § 405.
46. See EC-EC Environmental Liability Legislation, supra note 2 (reviewing the Convention by Europe's
Convention).
47. If an operator can prove a force majeure, that operator may be fully exonerated from environmental
liability. See Environment, supra note 4.
48. See EC-EC Environmental Liability Legislation, supra note 2 (reviewing the Convention by the
Council of Europe).
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Although the Convention is the first international legal document to propose
a general principle on environmental liability,49 at least two and perhaps four
members of the EU will not support the Convention endorsed by the Council of
Europe." The Commission has criticized the Convention's failure to provide
strict guidelines to prevent distortions of competition in the EU. 1 Nevertheless,
the Commission is considering using the Convention as a starting point for an EU
initiative.5 2 In addition to examining the environmental liability schemes of
individual member states, the Commission also surveyed the civil liability system
of the United States established under CERCLA.53
2. Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste
Notwithstanding the significant acceleration in EU environmental legislation
over the past twenty years, recent civil liability developments are elevating
concern over potential environmental liability.' The Council Directive on Civil
Liability for Damage Caused by Waste (Waste Directive)55 imposes strict, joint
and several liability for personal injuries, property damage, and environmental
damage.56 The Waste Directive, which endorses the imposition of strict liability
on the producers of waste, 7 has been criticized for its potential impact on lenders. 8
49. Environment, supra note 4.
50. Environment: The Council of Europe Convention on Environmental Liability, EC Commentaries
(Coopers & Lybrand) (Oct. 11, 1993) available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurscp File. Denmark and the United
Kingdom have announced their intention not to support the Convention. Id. Ireland and Germany disagree with
the approach to environmental liability taken by the Council of Europe. Id.
51. Environment, supra note 4 (explaining that the multitude of enforcement options available under the
Council's Convention will lead to distortions of competition).
52. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 4.1.2. The usefulness of the Convention as a model is limited by the
fact that it covers only damage caused by dangerous activities. Environment Council: Fairly Warm Welcome for
the Green Paperon Liability, EUR. ENERGY, Dec. 17,1993, § 414 (comments of EU Environment Commissioner
Ioannis Paleokrassas).
53. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 3.2.2 & annex. In addition to the Convention developed by the Council
of Europe, the Commission also analyzed systems of liability in Sweden and France. Id. § 3.2.2.
54. Turner T. Smith, Jr. & Roszell D. Hunter, The European Community Environmental Legal System,
22 ENVrs L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,106 (Feb. 1993) [hereinafter Smith & Hunter, Legal System].
55. Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1991 OJ. (C 192) 6 [hereinafter
Waste Directive].
56. Waste Directive, arts. 3, 5; Turner T. Smith, Jr. & Roszell D. Hunter, The Revised European Civil
LiabilityforDamage from Waste Proposal, 21 ENVrTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,719 (1991) [hereinafter Smith
& Hunter, Waste Proposal]. The Waste Directive raises liability problems similar to those faced in the United
States under CERCLA. Smith & Hunter, Legal System, supra note 54, at 10,134; Mounteer, supra note 31, at
127-28 (discussing lender liability under the Waste Directive).
57. Environment, supra note 4. If the producer could not be traced, the holder of waste would be held
liable. Id.
58. EC Banks Look Down a 'Bottomless Pit' of Environmental Liability as Rule Nears; Open.Ended
Liability and European Banks, INT'L BANK Accr., May 11, 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Bottomless Pit]. Under the
Waste Directive, lenders will be held liable for the environmental damage of their borrowers. Id. Hilary
Thompson, head of the environmental management unit at Britain's National Westminster Bank, notes that the
Waste Directive does not limit the liability exposure faced by lenders. id.
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Under the Waste Directive, liability is assigned on the basis of whether or not
a person had actual control of the waste at the time of incident.5 9 The Waste
Directive failed to define "actual control," but some commentators have suggested
that actual control may encompass the "ability" to control.' This expansive
interpretation of actual control draws frightening parallels to the infamous Fleet
Factors decision which equated the ability to influence hazardous waste
decisions with participation in management.62 The dangerous resemblance that
the Waste Directive bears to Fleet Factors, the epitome of lender liability in the
United States, alerts the transnational practitioner to examine carefully lender
liability in the United States.
The Council of Europe's Convention, the Waste Directive, and the Green
Paper are additions to the expanding arena of environmental legislation in
Europe.63 These proposals will likely foreshadow the inevitable adoption of civil
liability legislation in the EU.' All of the proposals embrace strict liability,
which is not unfamiliar to U.S. financial institutions operating under the strict,
joint and several liability system of CERCLA.65 Therefore, the U.S. experience
will provide valuable insight to EU lenders in assessing and minimizing
environmental lender liability.
III. RECENT TRENDS IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. CERCLA
In response to increasing environmental and health hazards posed by
hazardous substances and dump sites,6 the U.S. Congress enacted CERCLA in
59. Id. (discussing the Waste Directive); Smith & Hunter, Waste Proposal, supra note 56, at 10,718
(discussing the Waste Directive).
60. Mounteer, supra note 31, at 127-28; Smith & Hunter, Waste Proposal, supra note 56, at 10,718.
61. See infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
62. "[A] secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is
sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decision if it so chose."
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (lth Cir. 1990). See infra notes 79-98 and
accompanying text (examining United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.).
63. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 3.2.2 & annex; 1713RD Council Meeting Environment-Brussels, 2 and
3 December 1993 President: Mrs. Magda De Galan, Minister for the Environment in the Kingdom of Belgium,
RAPID, Dec. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, News.Library, RAPID File (recognizing that the Green Paper is part
of a series of measures concerning environmental civil liability); EC-EC Environmental Liability Legislation,
supra note 2; Smith & Hunter, Waste Proposal, supra note 56, at 10,718.
64. EC-EC Environmental Liability Legislation, supra note 2.
65. Id. See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Council's Convention); notes 54-62
and accompanying text (discussing the Waste Directive); infra notes 163-79 (discussing the Green Paper).
66. S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632
F. Supp. 573, 576 (1986); Patricia L. Quentel, Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous
Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 WiS. L. REV. 139 [hereinafter Quentel, Cleanup Costs].
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1980.67 CERCLA imposes strict, joint and several liability68 upon four catego-
ries of entities: (1) present owners and operators of hazardous waste sites, (2)
owners or operators of a facility at the time of hazardous waste disposal, (3)
persons or entities that arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous
substances at the facility, and (4) persons or entities that transported the hazardous
waste to the affected facility.69 CERCLA aspires to hold those responsible for the
creation of hazardous waste also responsible for its cleanup.70 CERCLA
empowers the President of the United States to take necessary action to "remove
or arrange for the removal" of hazardous substances. 7' By executive order, the
President delegated that power to the EPA.72 The EPA identifies and remedies
hazardous waste sites with federal monies earmarked for cleanup, commonly
known as the Superfund.73 Subsequent to cleanup, the EPA may seek to
67. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)).
68. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140-41 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding
that legislative history clearly established a strict liability standard under CERCLA); Theodore C. Taub, Pre-
Transaction and Transactional Issues Involving Hazardous Materials/Waste, ABA-ALI COURSE OF STUDY:
LAND USE INsTITUTE 251, 253 (1993) (noting that owners and operators are strictly and jointly and severally
liable for the cost of cleanup under CERCLA).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). Persons covered by CERCLA include:
(1) [Ihe owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances,
and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or
treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is
a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance ....
Id.
70. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 821 F. Supp. 707, 722 (S.D. Ga. 1993) [hereinafter Fleet
Factors I1] (stating that "one of CERCLA's central tenets is to make the polluter pay"); United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1553 (11th Cir. 1990). "The essential policy underlying CERCLA is to place the
ultimate responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste on 'those responsible for problems caused by the disposal
of chemical poison."' Id. (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11 th
Cir. 1990)). See also Green Paper, supra note 4, § 1.0 (providing that "a person should rectify damage that he
causes"); EEC Treaty, supra note 24, art. 130r (providing that the "polluter should pay").
71. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1994).
72. Executive Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1982); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632
F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986).
73. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1993) (establishing Hazardous Substance Superfund); 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1994)
(defining the uses of fund). The Hazardous Response Trust Fund is a body of funds which may be tapped by
the EPA to be used for the cleanup of environmentally damaged property. Id. § 9611 (1994) (listing the activities
which may financed); Comment, Cleaning Up the Debris After Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA 's
Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1249, 1251 (1991) [hereinafter Cleaning Up the Debris]
(describing the process of reimbursement of Superfund). "Superfund" is used to refer to the entire act as well
as to refer to the Hazardous Substance Superfund.
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reimburse the Superfund account by bringing suit against potentially liable
parties. 4
Lending institutions have fallen prey to CERCLA legislation, despite the fact
that CERCLA contains a security interest exemption.75 Courts have found
lenders liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA in two instances: (1) when
contaminated property has been foreclosed upon,76 and (2) when lenders become
involved in the management operations of a liable facility.77 Consequently in
1991, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in the United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp. adopted an expansive standard of liability.78
B. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.
In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,79 the U.S. government sued the
shareholders of a cloth printing facility, Swainsboro Print Works (SPW), and its
creditor, Fleet Factors Corp. (FFC) to recover hazardous waste cleanup costs.80
74. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); Cleaning Up the Debris, supra note 73, at 1251. The Green Paper notes
the existence of the U.S. Superfund as an example of a joint compensation system. Green Paper, supra note 73,
§ 3.2.2.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994).
The term "owner or operator" ... does not include a person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest in the vessel or facility.
Id. Banks in the EU fear environmental liability in the absence of a secured creditor exemption. Lender Liability,
WORLD INS. REP., Mar. 13, 1992. The transnational practitioner would be wise to be aware of potential
environmental liability even in the presence of a secured creditor exemption. See United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990) (indicating that lenders will be liable where the lender has the capacity
to influence hazardous waste decisions); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa.
1989) (holding that the secured creditor exemption does not survive foreclosure); United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (finding that the security interest exemption unavailable
when a lender foreclosed on contaminated property); infra notes 189-225 and accompanying text (discussing
preventive measures for lenders). But see In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
a security interest exemption applies until actual participation in the management of the facility); United States
v. Mirabile, [1985] 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that foreclosing
lenders become liable only if they exercise control over the day-to-day operations of a site); In re T.P. Long
Chem., 45 B.R. 278, 288-89 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (finding that participation in management of facility was
necessary to forfeit the security interest exemption). The Eleventh Circuit rejected the formulation in United
States v. Mirabite. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558. "We, therefore, specifically reject the formulation of the
secured creditor exemption suggested by the District Court in Mirabile'" Id.
76. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). In Maryland
Bank, the court ultimately held that a mortgagee who purchased at a foreclosure sale is not entitled to the
security interest exemption because the mortgagee purchased at the foreclosure sale, not to protect the security
interest, but rather to protect the investment. Id. at 579.
77. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. "It is not necessary for the secured creditor to involve itself in the
day-to-day operations ... in order to be liable." Id.
78. Id. at 1558 (holding that a secured creditor's involvement need only support the inference that the
creditor could involve itself in waste decisions); Taub, supra note 68, at 268 (noting that the court created a
"radically expansive standard").
79. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1550.
80. Id. at 1553.
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FFC loaned money to SPW in return for an assignment of accounts receivable and
taking a security interest in the textile facility, its equipment, inventory, and
fixtures.8 Five years later SPW declared bankruptcy and FFC foreclosed on its
security interest in SPW's inventory and equipment.82 A liquidating company
sold most of the collateral on behalf of FFC; FFC contracted with another party
to remove the remaining equipment.
83
Subsequent to the liquidation, the EPA discovered 700 drums of toxic waste
and a large amount of asbestos on the property." The EPA removed and
disposed of the hazardous waste at a cost of $400,000."5 The cleanup cost
became the crux of the litigation.86 The EPA sued to recover the cleanup
expenditures from FFC alleging that FFC was liable either as a present owner or
as an owner during the release or threatened release of hazardous waste.87
The Eleventh Circuit held that FFC was not liable as a present owner or
operator.88 However, the government also sought to recover under the past
owner provision in CERCLA.8 9 In response to this charge, FFC sought protec-
tion from liability under the security interest exemption, which exempts from
liability those owners holding an ownership interest in order to protect a security
interest. 90 The court conceded that FFC held the indicia of ownership merely as
a security interest, but the court still examined the extent of FFC's liability as a
participant in the management of the facility.9t The court fashioned a new rule
which declares secured creditors liable when "involvement with the management
of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose."'
As a result of this new test, the Fleet Factors decision prompted an uproar
in the lending community and later prompted the EPA to develop regulations
81. Id. at 1552.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1553.
84. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1553.
85. Id,
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1552.
88. Id. at 1555. See supra note 69 (setting forth the text of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)).
89. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1554. See supra note 69 (setting forth the text of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)).
Liable parties include "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated
any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed." Id.
90. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556. See supra note 75 (setting forth the text of the security interest
exemption).
91. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556.
92. Id. at 1558. See Greenberg & Shaw, supra note 17, at 1212 (stating that after the Fleet Factors
decision, lenders in the position to control borrower's hazardous waste decisions may be liable even without
exercising control); Michael B. Kupin, New Alternations of the Lender Liability Landscape: CERCLA After the
Fleet Factors Decision, 19 REAL EST. L. J. 191, 207 (1991) (stating that the standard is whether or not the
lender has "capacity to influence" hazardous waste treatment activities); Cleaning Up the Debris, supra note 73,
at 1257 (1991) (stating that after Fleet Factors decision, a lender will be liable if its involvement suggests that
it could influence hazardous waste disposal decisions).
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explaining the security interest exemption in an effort to protect the interests of
financial institutions.93 Today, lending institutions in the United States confront
genuine prospects of environmental liability.94 Moreover their European
colleagues fear similar exposure with the advent of the Green Paper.95 When
drafting the Green Paper, the Commission recognized the existence of problems
under CERCLA and acknowledged the need to appreciate the effects of
environmental civil liability on financial institutions.96 Since the EPA regulations
have been effective in curbing environmental lender liability in the United
States,97 EU law makers should review and utilize the security interest exemp-
tion, as clarified by the EPA, in order to protect lenders from the perils of liability
experienced under CERCLA.98
C. Examining the EPA Regulations
Following the decision announced in Fleet Factors,99 the EPA responded to
growing resentment among financial institutions by promulgating a rule
explaining the security interest exemption under CERCLA. t°° In April 1992, the
EPA issued its explanation and supplementary report.10' The EPA clarified the
security interest exemption by defining CERCLA terminology and identifying
actions by lenders that constitute management participation sufficient to render
liability.' The rule defines the meaning of the phrases "indicia of ownership,"
"primarily to protect a security interest," and "participating in the management of
93. Brent Nicholson & Todd Zuiderhoek,,The Lender Liability Dilemma: Fleet Factors History &
Aftermath, 38 S.D. L. REv. 22, 38 (1993) (noting that lenders and federal agencies, such as the FDIC and the
Resolution Trust Corp., became concerned with lender liability).
94. Id. at 38-39. In addition to environmental liability, lenders also risk the loss of the security because
contamination will render the property valueless. Id.
95. Lender Liability and How It Effects [sic] Customers' Credit Rating, Bus. INT'L MONEY REP., July
5, 1993 (noting" that banks are focusing attention on lender liability).
96. Green Paper, supra note 3, §§ 3.2.2, 4.1.2, annex II (recognizing that credit institutions have become
liable upon taking possession of land).
97. Kelley v. Tiscornia, 810 F. Supp. 901,905 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Products
Corp., 810 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (D. Minn. 1993). See Lavalette, supra note 17, at 508 (commenting that the EPA
rule offers guidance for lenders); infra notes 137-58 and accompanying text (discussing the favorable judicial
reception to the EPA regulations).
98. CIC Reviews Lending Liability Policy, HAzNEWs, Dec. 1992. The French banking group, Union
Europeenne de CIC, has examined the EPA rule and believes that the EU will follow the U.S. civil liability
legislation model. Id.
99. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1lth Cir. 1990).
100. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,344-45 (1992) (The EPA rule "clariffies] and specif[ies] the range of
activities which may be undertaken"). The EPA regulations provide "guidance by synthesizing earlier case law
and providing a framework within which the Exemption's coverage may be analyzed." Fleet Factors II, 821 F.
Supp. 707, 711 (1993); Lavalette, supra note 17, at 487 (1993) (stating that the EPA rule sought to identify
permissible activities). See supra note 75 (setting forth text of the security interest exemption).
101. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,348 (1992). See Lavalette, supra note 17, at 487-92 (1993) (reviewing the
introduction of the EPA rule).
102. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c) (1992).
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a vessel or facility" and specifies activities permissible upon and after foreclo-
sure."°3 The following sections discuss each of the principle phrases and
permissible lender activities as clarified by the EPA rule.
1. Indicia of Ownership
"Indicia of ownership"''1 4 requires evidence of a security interest, interest
in a security interest, or an interest in realty or personalty securing a loan or other
obligation."05 The rule permits the acquisition of legal or equitable title in
property incident to foreclosure or its equivalents to qualify as a security
interest."°l Many of those commenting on the EPA proposal supported the
preservation of the exemption upon foreclosure because at the point of foreclosure
lenders have exhausted all other options available to manage incurable de-
fault.0 7 The regulations also emphasize that a person does not have to hold title
103. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992). Recall the security interest exemption: "Owner and operator ... does
not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (1994). See
supra note 75 (setting forth text of the security interest exemption). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
invalidated the EPA rule because the court determined that the Congress had not delegated the statutory authority
to the EPA to promulgate a clarification to the security interest exemption. Kelley v. EPA, No. 92-1312, 1994
WESTLAW 27,881 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 4, 1994). Nevertheless, the invalidation of the rule does not affect its
usefulness as a model for drafting environmental legislation in the EU. See supra notes 99-162 and
accompanying text (discussing the EPA rule). Prior to its invalidation, the EPA rule had successfully safeguarded
lenders from environmental liability in the United States. See supra notes 150-62 (examining the benefits of the
EPA rule). Consequently, lenders were better equipped to anticipate potential liability concerns than under
previous conflicting case law. Id; supra note 75 (recognizing conflicting interpretations of the security interest
exemption). The EPA's intrusion on congressional legislative duties should not reflect unfavorably upon the
merit of the rule as a prototype for EU lawmakers; its usefulness has not been diminished. See supra notes 99-
103 and accompanying text; infra notes 104-62 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA rule).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994); see supra note 73 (setting forth the text of security interest
exemption).
105. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(a) (1992).
Evidence of such interest include, but are not limited to.... deeds of trust, liens, surety bonds and
guarantees of obligations, title held pursuant to a lease financing transaction in which the lessor does
not select initially the leased property,... legal or equitable title obtained pursuant to foreclosure,
and their equivalents .... assignments, pledges, or other rights to or other forms of encumbrance
against property that are held primarily to protect a security interest. A person is not required to hold
title or a security interest in order to maintain indicia of ownership.
Id.
106. l; 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,347 (1992). See supra note 105 (setting forth the text of regulation);
infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text (discussing foreclosure and postforeclosure activities). The EPA
believed that including foreclosing holders within the security interest exemption would prevent the shutdown
of an otherwise viable business and the termination of its employees. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,347 (1992).
107. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18361 (1992). The EPA found support for this interpretation in United States
v. Maryland Bank & Trust, Inc. Id. (citing United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579
(D. Md. 1986)). In that case, the court held that the security interest exemption does not apply "to former
mortgagees currently holding title after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, at least when, as here, the
former mortgagee has held title for nearly four years." United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, Co., 632 F.
Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986). The EPA believed that the preservation of the exemption for foreclosing lenders
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in order to maintain indicia of ownership." 8 Finally, the EPA rejected the
premise that the exemption should only apply to title theory jurisdictions and
announced that the purpose of the exemption was to treat holders in all
jurisdictions similarly."
2. Primarily to Protect a Security Interest
The EPA rule also defines the phrase "primarily as a security interest" to
denote an interest created or established in a vessel or facility for the purpose of
securing a loan or other obligation.' The subdivision contains a nonexhaustive
list of transactions traditionally recognized as giving rise to a security interest."'
The rule does not protect, however, interests held primarily for investment
purposes or purposes other than security protection.' Nevertheless, protection
will be granted so long as the primary reason is the protection of a security
interest.'
1 3
was consistent because the case did not preclude the application of the exemption; rather, the facts did not
warrant the preservation in that case. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,360-62 (1992).
108. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(a) (1992). See supra note 105 (setting forth the text of § 300.1100(a)). One
commentator describes this as a deviation from the original meaning under CERCLA, which carved out the
security interest exemption to protect mortgagees in title theory jurisdictions. Lavalette, supra note 17, at 479.
The security interest exemption was introduced to protect from liability titleholders who have not participated
in management. Id.
109. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,351 (1992). Thus, the EPA's interpretation applies equally in both title theory
and lien theory jurisdictions, even though the mortgagee does not hold title in a lien theory jurisdiction. Id. In
a title theory jurisdiction, the mortgagee holds legal title in the security until the mortgage obligation has been
satisfied or discharged; whereas in a lien theory jurisdiction, the mortgagor does not hold legal title, but merely
holds a security interest and the mortgagor is recognized as the owner of the property until foreclosure. GRANT
S. NELSON & DALE H. WHrrMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw §§ 4.1-4.2 (2nd ed. 1985). See generally id.
(reviewing the lien and title theories).
110. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b) (1992).
111. Id § 300.1100(b)(1) (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344,18,351-52 (1992). Under the EPA rule, mortgages,
deeds of trusts, liens, title pursuant to lease financing transactions are security interests. Id. The EPA disagreed
that lease financing agreements should not be included in the list of transactions creating a security interest; that
type of financing arrangement is maintained to secure a loan or other obligation. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,352
(1992). Sale and leasebacks, conditional sales, installment sales, trust receipt transactions, certain assignments,
factoring agreements, accounts receivable financing arrangements, and consignments which create or establish
an interest in the vessel of facility to secure an interest or other obligation also constitute a security interest. 40
C.F.R. § 300.1100(b)(1) (1992).
112. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b)(2) (1992). The motivations of a lender are relevant only to determine
whether the indicia of ownership is held primarily for security purposes. Id. But see Greenberg & Shaw, supra
note 17, at 1241 (criticizing the intent test because lending itself is a form of investment).
113. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b)(2) (1992); Lavalette, supra note 17, at 488-89 (discussing primarily the
protection of a security interest). The rule does not permit nonsecured creditors to claim the security interest
exemption. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,352 (1992).
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3. Participating in the Management of a Vessel or Facility
The EPA rule extensively discusses activities which constitute participation
in management."' Participation in management refers to actual participation in
the management or operational affairs of the vessel or facility by the holder."5
The EPA developed a two-prong test to determine activities that constitute
participation in management by the holder while the debtor is still in possession
of the property."6 The test inquires into the management and decision-making
control of the holder. If the holder meets either prong, that holder's actions
constitute participation in management."'
Under the first prong, the actions constitute participation in management if the
holder "exercises decision-making control over the [debtor's] environmental
compliance, such that the holder has undertaken a responsibility for the [debtor's]
hazardous substance handling or disposal practices.""'  Under the second prong,
a holder's action constitutes participation in the management if the holder
exercises management level control of the daily decisions with respect to
114. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1) (1992). This section states:
Participation in the managements of a facility means... actual participation in the management or
operational affairs of the vessel or facility by the holder, and does not include the mere capacity to
influence, or ability to influence, or the unexercised right to control facility operations. A holder is
participating in management, while the borrower is still in possession of the vessel or facility
encumbered by the security interest, only if the holder either
(i) Exercises decision-making control over the borrower's environmental compliance, such that the
holder has undertaken responsibility for the borrower's hazardous substance handling or
disposal practices; or
(ii) Exercises control at a level comparable to that of a manager of the borrower's enterprise, such
that the holder has assumed or manifested responsibility for the overall management of the
enterprise encompassing the day-to-day decision making of the enterprise with the respect to:
(A) Environmental compliance or
(B) All, or substantially all, of the operational (as opposed to financial or administrative)
aspects of the enterprise other than environmental compliance. Operation aspects of the
enterprise include functions such as that of facility or plant manager, operations manager,
chief operating officer, or chief executive officer.
Financial or administrative aspects include functions such as that of credit manager, accounts
payable/receivable manager, personnel manager, controller, chief financial officer, or similar
functions.
Id.
115. Id. Cf. supra notes 79-98 and accompanying text (reviewing United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.).
116. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1100(c)(1)(i)-(ii) (1992). See Lavalette, supra note 17, at 489-92 (discussing the
EPA's two-prong test for determining participation in management).
117. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(1) (1992). See Lavalette, supra note 17, at 489-92 (discussing the EPA's
two-prong test for determining participation in management).
118. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1)(i) (1992). Regardless of whether the holder actually caused the waste
release or threatened release, the lender may have exercised management control sufficient to render liability.
57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,355, 18,359 (1992); Patricia L. Quentel, EPA Issues Long-Awaited Lender Liability
Rule, 22 EsvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,640 (Oct. 1992) [hereinafter Quentel, Long-Awaited Rule].
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environmental compliance1 9 or substantially all of the operational aspects other
than environmental compliance."2 In order to prevent financial institutions from
insulating themselves from liability, the EPA included the latter provision to
prevent lenders from assuming control over a substantial portion of a vessel's or
facility's operation and then claiming the security interest exemption., Thus,
financial institutions exerting substantial operational control will be adjudged
participants in management even though the control does not extend to environ-
mental compliance."
In addition to expounding a test for management participation, the EPA also
incorporated an explanation of activities which do not comprise management
participation."2 During loan negotiations, the rule permits prospective lenders
to require environmental inspections or to order cleanup without incurring liability
for participating in the management of the facility. 24 Lenders are also entitled
to police and engage in workout activities with their borrowers."z Permissible
policing activities include: requiring the borrower to cleanup the facility or
comply with environmental laws, inspecting the facility, monitoring the debtor's
financial condition, and requiring borrower compliance with the loan terms."
The EPA recognized that troubled loans may necessitate increased lender
participation to avert debtor default, and consequently outlined acceptable workout
activities."' Permissible workout procedures include: restructuring or renegotiat-
ing the terms, elevating the rent or interest, exercising forbearance, assigning
accounts, and providing financial advice and guidance.1"
119. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1)(ii)(A) (1992). See supra note 114 (setting forth the text of
§ 300.1100(c)(1)).
120. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1)(ii)(B) (1992). See supra note 114 (setting forth the text of
§ 300.1100(c)(1)). A lender will not be deemed to have participated in management if control exists over the
financial or administrative aspects of the enterprise. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,360 (1992). Thus, a lender can
safely participate as credit manager, chief financial officer, personnel manager, or other financial or
administrative activities. Id.
121. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,360 (1992). See Lavalette, supra note 17, at 490 (discussing the restriction
on carving out environmental control to prevent liability).
122. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(1)(ii)(b) (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,360 (1992).
123. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2) (1992).
124. Id. § 300.1100(c)(2)(i) (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,353-54 (1992). See infra notes 192-228 and
accompanying text (reviewing practical guidelines to avoid environmental lender liability).
125. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2)(ii) (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,356-57 (1992). See infra notes 192-
228 and accompanying text (reviewing practical guidelines to avoid environmental lender liability).
126. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2)(ii)(A) (1992). The list provided.by the EPA was not intended to be
exhaustive; activities not listed are subject to analysis under the two-prong test for participation in management.
57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,375 (1992).
127. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,356-57 (1992).
128. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2)(ii)(B) (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,356-57 (1992). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(d)(1) (1994) (providing that a person shall not be liable for activities in accordance with the National
Contingency Plan or at the direction of the on-site coordinator).
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4. Foreclosure and Postforeclosure Activities
The EPA rule also examines foreclosure and postforeclosure activities which
may be conducted pursuant to the security interest exemption. 29 A holder will
continue to maintain indicia of ownership primarily for protection of its security
interest after foreclosure if the holder undertakes to sell, release, or otherwise
divest itself of ownership of the contaminated property in a reasonably expedi-
tious and commercially reasonable manner.'3° The holder may further engage
in activities related to the sale and release of the property entailing liquidation,
protection or preservation of assets, maintenance of business activities, and wrap
up operations. 13  Further, in order to maintain the status of a security interest
holder, the holder must list or advertise the property within the year following
foreclosure and must refrain from outbidding, rejecting, or forgoing any offer of
fair consideration for the property.
132
The EPA regulations enable lenders to engage in activities related to borrower
behavior and management of the security with reasonable assurance that they will
not be held liable as owners or operators participating in the management of a
vessel or facility. 3 3 Instead of forgoing foreclosure and workout options, several
cases have indicated that a lender may safely maneuver around the pitfalls of
liability existing prior to the promulgation of the EPA rule and subsequent to the
129. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d) (1992). See Quentel, Long-Awaited Rule, supra note 118, at 10,641
(discussing permissible foreclosure and postforeclosure activities pursuant to the EPA rule).
130. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(d)(1) (1992). A holder will lose its status as maintaining indicia of ownership
primarily to protect a security interest if the holder outbids, rejects, or fails to act upon a written, bona ide, firm
offer of fair consideration. Id. The EPA interpreted the security interest exemption to protect holders when
foreclosure is undertaken to recover the security. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,347 (1992). The crucial issue is
whether the lender's behavior indicates an active desire to recover the obligation by making reasonable efforts
to sell or otherwise divest itself of ownership of the contaminated property. Id.
131. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(d)(2) (1992). However, lenders need to limit their postforeclosure activities.
Following the promulgation of the EPA rule, the action in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. was reactivated.
Fleet Factors II, 821 F. Supp. 707, 712 (S.D. Ga. 1993). Relying on the EPA's recently promulgated rule, a
Georgia federal district court found that Fleet Factors Corp. (FFC) had lost its security interest exemption as a
result of postforeclosure activities. Id. at 720. The liquidating company, hired by FFC to sell the secured
collateral subsequent to foreclosure, exceeded the level of contact permissible under 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(2)
when it handled environmental waste which was readily identifiable and apparent and present in significant
quantities. Id. at 719-20. FFC was also held liable for the activities of the contracted cleanup crew, which
haphazardly handled hazardous substances aggravating the environmental threat and likewise failed to complete
salvage operations in a reasonable amount of time. Id. at 720.
132. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 100(d)(2)(i)-(ii) (1992). The property must be listed with a broker, dealer, or other
agent dealing with the particular type of property or advertised in a newspaper with a general circulation of over
10,000 or other acceptable trade or real estate publication. Id. § 300.1 100(d)(2)(i) (1992). Unless required by
law to make or obtain a higher bid, the holder may not outbid or reject fair offers. Id. § 300.1100(d)(2)(ii)
(1992).
133. Lavalette, supra note 17, at 508.
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decision in Fleet Factors."34 Neither this comment nor the EPA regulations
suggest that lenders have absolute insulation from environmental liability. The
EPA regulations, while quite generous, do not permit financial institutions to
freely involve themselves in the debtor-polluter's waste decisions. 35 Nor do the
EPA regulations permit lenders, while participating in substantially all of the
debtor-polluter's operational activities, to carve out their own exemption by
exclusively removing their ability to exercise discretion over waste decisions.
1 36
D. Judicial Reception to the EPA Rule
Judicial reception to the EPA rule has been promising. Since its promulgation,
the EPA rule has been noted in at least four cases. 137 In January 1993, two
federal district courts ruled that lenders were shielded from liability by the
security interest exemption as explained by the EPA rule.13 Likewise, two
federal appellate courts have acknowledged the protection afforded by the EPA
rule.1 39 These cases foreshadow the favorable auspices of avoiding environmen-
tal liability.
In Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Products Corp., a U.S. district court in
Minnesota held that the security interest exemption embodied in CERCLA, as
134. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Prods. Corp., 810 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (D. Minn. 1993) (finding
that the lender's activities were within the safe harbor provision of the EPA rule); Kelley v. Tiscornia, 810 F.
Supp. 901, 909 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (finding that the lender's activities did not relate to the operational aspects
of the enterprise necessary for a finding of liability under the EPA rule). U.S. court decisions have found in
favor of lenders without relying on the rule, despite the fact that the legality of the EPA regulations had been
challenged. United States v. McLamb, 5 F.3d 69,71 (4th Cir. 1993); Waterville Indus. Inc. v. Finance Auth. of
Maine, 984 F.2d 549, 553 (1st Cir. 1993). See supra note 103 (noting that subsequent to the decisions in
McLamb and Waterville Indus., the EPA rule was invalidated). These courts seem less willing to fuel the blaze
of liability by sacrificing deep pocket lenders. See infra notes 137-58 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
reception to the EPA rule).
135. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1)(i) (1992) (limiting decision-making control by lenders); supra notes
114-28 and accompanying text (discussing the permissible lender activities under the EPA rule).
136. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(1)(ii) (1992) (limiting management-level control by lenders); supra notes
114-28 and accompanying text (discussing the permissible lender activities under the EPA rule).
137. McLamb, 5 F.3d at 73; Waterville, 984 F.2d at 553; Fleet Factors Corp. 821 F. Supp. at 713;
Ashland, 810 F. Supp. at 1059; Kelley, 810 F. Supp. at 905. See supra note 103 (noting that the EPA rule has
been invalidated by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals).
138. Ashland, 810 F. Supp. at 1060; Kelley, 810 F. Supp. at 909 (relying on the EPA regulations, the court
granted summary judgment finding that the bank fell within the security interest exemption under CERCLA).
The bank's involvement in the activities of the enterprise were permitted under the EPA regulations. Kelley, 810
F. Supp. at 901. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1)(ii)(B) (1992) (limiting permissible lender activities). Actions
included in participation of management include exercise of management level control with respect to all, or
substantially all, of the operational aspects of the enterprise other than environmental compliance. Id. On a
motion for summary judgment, the Ashland court held that a lender fell within CERCLA's security interest
exemption and was not liable for cleanup costs. Ashland, 810 F. Supp. at 1057. The lender's activities associated
with the property did not constitute actual participation. Id. The court also concluded that the EPA regulations
were consistent with CERCLA and thus entitled to deference. Id.
139. McLamb, 5 F.3d at 73; Waterville, 984 F.2d at 553.
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interpreted by the EPA rule, safeguarded a lender who briefly took title to the
assets of an alleged polluter." In that case, a property owner sued its tenant's
lender to recover cleanup costs resulting from the tenant's use of the premises for
manufacturing wood preservatives. 4t Following the tenant's petition for
bankruptcy, the lender foreclosed on the secured assets and briefly held title
before transferring the property to a buyer.t42 The court rejected the owner's
claim that the lender was liable as an owner of the property at the time hazardous
waste was disposed. t43 Holding that the EPA rule applied,' 44 the court con-
cluded that the lender's fleeting ownership fell within CERCLA's security interest
exemption.1
45
Immediately following Ashland Oil, a district court in Michigan applied the
EPA interpretation of the security interest exemption and dismissed a liability
claim against a lender.'4 In Kelley v. Tiscornia, the State of Michigan sued a
lending institution to recover expenditures assessed during the cleanup of a site
operated and owned by a loan customer. 47 Between 1964 and 1988, the lender
made several loans to a manufacturing company. 148 The lender also retained a
position on the company's board and monitored the accounts receivable and other
financial activities of the corporation.' 49 The court examined the bank's
activities between 1964 and 1986 and between 1986 and 1988.50
140. Ashland, 810 F. Supp. at 1060-61.
141. Id. at 1058-59.
142. Id. at 1059-60. The lender held the property for approximately four weeks. Id. at 1060. The buyer
financed the transaction with a loan from the same lender. Id. When the buyer defaulted, the lender abandoned
its security interest in the assets. Id.
143. Id. at 1059-60. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994) (setting forth prior owner liability).
144. Ashland, 810 F. Supp. at 1059-60 n.4.
145. Id. at 1060. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994) (setting forth the security interest exemption); 40
C.F.R. § 300.1100(a) (1992) (codifying the EPA's clarification of the security interest exemption); Lavalette,
supra note 17, at 490 (noting that the district court applied the EPA rule to find that the security exemption
applied). The district court relied on case law to support the conclusion that the EPA rule is consistent with the
security interest exemption embodied in CERCLA. Ashland, 810 F. Supp. at 1060 (citing In re Bergsoe Metal
Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Mirabile, [1985] 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,992, (E.D. Pa. 1985)). See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
security interest exemption is not voided by reservation of right to protect security); United States v. Mirabile,
[1985] 15 ENVl . L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that foreclosure is within
the security interest exemption under CERCLA).
146. Kelley v. Tiscomia, 810 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (dismissing on summary judgment a
CERCLA claim against a lender for cleanup costs).
147. Id. at 902.
148. Id. at 902-04.
149. ld.
150. Id.
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The district court relied on the EPA's clarification and found that the lender
was entitled to the protection of the security interest exemption."' The district
court held that bank's participation in semiannual board meetings and other
financially related monitoring activities between 1964 and 1986 did not amount
to the actual decision making necessary to establish liability.152 Furthermore, the
bank's later insistence for outside management and other financial recommenda-
tions did not constitute day-to-day control of the company's operational decisions
sufficient to render liability.153
Although not relying explicitly on the EPA rule, two federal appellate courts
have also found in favor of lenders in recent lender liability cases.'t 4 The First
Circuit found a loan guarantor was entitled to protection under the secured
creditor exemption of CERCLA.155 The court refused to permit "maturation of
ownership" to divest the guarantor of its protection under CERCLA's security
interest exemption, even though the loan guarantor became the record owner of
the property by accepting a deed in lieu of foreclosure. 56 Similarly, the Fourth
Circuit permitted a foreclosing lender to claim the protection of the security
interest exemption." Relying on the absence of investment or profit motivation,
lack of other bidders, and prompt turn around of the property, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the lender acquired title to the property solely to protect its
151. Kelley, 810 F. Supp. at 909. Notably, the district court recognized the detrimental consequences of
holding banks liable under CERCLA. Id. Banks will abstain from workout attempts in favor of accelerating loans
which "virtually guarantees an increase in the country's inventory of abandoned and inactive hazardous waste
disposal sites." Id.
152. Id. at 907. The board did not involve itself in the operational decisions or environmental issues of
the manufacturing company; those decisions were reserved for the executive committee. Id. The EPA rule
requires actual participation in the management by the lender, influence is not sufficient. Id. at 906-07. Michigan
failed to demonstrate the day-to-day actual, operational control of the facility necessary for a finding of liability.
Id. at 906-07. See supra note 114 (providing full text of 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1)); Lavalette, supra note 17,
at 506-07 (noting that the court relied on the EPA rule to interpret the secured creditor exemption).
153. Kelley, 810 F. Supp. at 902-04. A person exerting influence over a "facility manager but who has no
power to direct or implement operational decisions is not 'participating in management,' even if the level of
influence exerted over the borrower is substantial." 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,359. See Kelley, 810 F. Supp. at
908 (discussing the EPA rule).
154. United States v. McLamb, 5 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993); Waterville Indus. Inc. v. Finance Auth. of
Maine, 984 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993).
155. Waterville, 984 F.2d at 550.
156. Id. at 550, 553. The guarantor, on the same day as receiving a deed in lieu of foreclosure, released
the property to the defaulting tenant. Id. at 551. Hazardous waste was released on the property during the tenure
of the second lease. Id. The tenant's financial difficulties persisted and the guarantor eventually sold the property
within 18 months of being declared titleholder by the tenant's bankruptcy court. Id. The court recognized the
same policy expounded in the EPA rule--protecting lenders who promptly divest themselves of ownership. Id.
at 553; supra notes 129-32 (discussing foreclosure activities by lenders).
157. McLamb, 5 F.3d at 71. See supra note 75 (setting forth the text of the security interest exemption).
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security interest and acted reasonably and promptly to divest itself of owner-
ship. 58
In the cases in which it has been tested, the EPA rule has successfully
protected lenders from the overly expansive realm of liability announced in Fleet
Factors.5 9 Consequently, lenders in the United States are better able to evaluate
the risks associated with participation in borrower activities."6° Since the advent
of the Green Paper, which fails to define liable parties, lenders in the EU face
uncertain liability.'6' During the uncertain period prior to the enactment of
legislation, lenders need to take preventative measures to limit their exposure to
liability."62 Moreover, lenders should lobby for legislation which, similar to the
EPA rule, clearly defines permissible lender behavior.
IV. PREVmEW OF EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. The Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage
Enacted by the Commission and presented to the Council of Ministers and
Parliament, the Green Paper discusses the various options and alternatives
considered by the EU to remedy environmental damage.' 63 The Green Paper
discusses the adoption of a system of civil liability based on the "polluter should
pay" principle first acknowledged in the SEA."6 The Commission believes that
civil liability advances the dual goals of deterring future contamination and
compelling responsible parties to clean up existing environmental damage. 6 5
158. McLamb, 5 F.3d at 72. Roughly 10 months passed between the lender's purchase and resale of the
property. Id. at 71. The court also noted that the lender had also met the second requirement of the security
interest exemption in that it did not participate in the management of the property. Id. at 72. The court also noted
that an identical conclusion would result under the EPA rule. Id. See supra note 75 (setting forth the text of the
security interest exemption).
159. See supra notes 137-58 and accompanying text (discussing judicial reception to the EPA rule).
160. Lavalette, supra note 17, at 508 (noting that the EPA offers predictability for lenders); supra notes
137-58 and accompanying text (discussing the favorable judicial reception to the EPA rule).
161. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text (discussing liability fears in the ELI).
162. See infra notes 192-228 and accompanying text (suggesting preventative guidelines to be followed
by EU lenders).
163. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.0; Environment, supra note 4 (noting that the Green Paper discusses
the possibility of EU-wide action for restoring environmental damage); Napier, supra note 4 (stating that the
Green Paper is a discussion on remedying environmental damage).
164. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.0; EEC Treaty, supra note 24, art. 130r. See Environment, supra note
4 (noting that the Green Paper adopts the "polluter pays principle"); Napier, supra note 4 (commenting on the
Green Paper's polluter pays policy as the basis of community environmental policy). See also supra notes 30-32
and accompanying text (discussing the mandate of the EEC Treaty that the polluter should pay).
165. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.0. See Environment, supra note 4 (noting civil liability implements
the polluter pays principle and deters future damage); Napier, supra note 4 (commenting that the Green Paper's
policy of civil liability will create an incentive for the prevention of pollution).
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In the Green Paper, the Commission considered both strict and fault-based
liability.16 The Commission seems convinced that a system of strict liability is
better suited for remedying environmental damage because strict liability provides
legal certainty, increases incentives for better risk management, and assists in
implementing the polluter should pay principle. 67 Although the environmental
damage must be linked to the activities of the allegedly liable party, strict liability
eases the burden of proof by removing the need to prove fault.16
In spite of the advantages of a strict liability system, the Commission also
identifies the limitations of strict, civil liability. 69 The Commission recognizes
that the outrageous costs associated with an overly expansive strict liability
scheme may stifle industry. 7 The Commission suggests that such problems
may be overcome by an integrated environmental liability scheme, where the
limitations of a civil liability scheme are supplemented by a system of joint
compensation.' The Commission recognizes that the effectiveness of a civil
liability scheme is frustrated when environmental damage cannot be attributed to
a particular party.'72 Consequently, the Commission has suggested a system of
joint compensation, similar to the Superfund in the United States, to make up for
the deficiencies of a strict liability scheme.173
166. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 2.2.1; Environment, supra note 4 (recognizing that the Green Paper
discusses both a fault-based liability regime and a strict liability system); Napier, supra note 4 (stating that the
Green Paper discusses fault-based and strict liability for remedying environmental damage).
167. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 4.1.2; Napier, supra note 4 (noting that the Green Paper recognizes that
strict liability is suited to remedyinglenvironmental damage and concludes that strict liability will deter damage).
"Strict liability appears to be particularly suited to the specific features of repairing environmental damage."
Green Paper, supra note 3, § 4.1.2. CERCLA is also a civil liability system based on strict liability of
responsible parties. See supra note 68 (noting that CERCLA is a strict liability system).
168. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 4.1.2. "[Sltrict liability eases the burden of attaching liability because
fault need not be established. However, the injured party must still prove that the damage was caused by
someone's act." Id.
169. Id. § 2.1 (discussing the limitations of civil liability in remedying environmental damage).
170. Id § 2.1.2. While an overly broad strict liability system will hamper industry, a narrow liability
scheme may fail to encompasses all of the potentially threatening activities. Id. Napier, supra note 4 (stating that
a strict liability may be regarded as unjust or become to expensive for targeted sectors).
171. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 3.0. See Environment, supra note 4 (noting that the Green Paper
discusses a compensation system to cover costs when a liable party cannot be located); Napier, supra note 4
(stating that the Green Paper considers a compensations scheme to cover costs when not met by civil liability).
172. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 4.0 & fig. 1. The effectiveness of a civil liability scheme may be
hampered when successive acts of pollution or historical pollution impede the ability to identify a liable party.
Id. §§ 2.1.5(i), 3.0. A similar problem arises when the type of damage, for example the loss of a species of
fauna, makes it difficult to place a monetary value on the damage. Id. § 2.1.10. Finally, civil liability requires
a party with standing to sue on behalf of the environment. Id. § 2.1.9. See Napier, supra note 4 (reviewing the
limitations of strict liability including identifying parties, apportioning liability, and standing to sue).
173. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 3.0; 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1993) (establishing Hazardous Substance
Superfund); 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1994) (describing the uses of the fund). "Joint compensation systems sustained
by contributions from the economic sectors most closely linked to the type of damage needing restoration would
be concrete applications of the polluter pays principle." Green Paper, supra note 3, § 3.0. The Hazardous
Substance Superfund is financed with environmental taxes, penalties, reimbursement monies, and punitive
damages recovered under CERCLA and the Clean Water Act. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9507(b)(1)-(5) (1993) (noting
279
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Presumably, the suggested joint compensation system will not generate lender
liability because industries contribute to a general fund based on participation in
damage-causing industries. 74 Nevertheless, financial institutions will face
liability in the wake of expanding environmental liability in the EU. t75 Lenders
may encounter liability by taking possession of waste when enforcing a security
interest or by influencing the management or control of waste as a condition of
a loan. 17 6
Although the Green Paper announced the EU's intention to implement a
system of strict, civil liability for environmental damage, the Green Paper left
unanswered the most important question: Who will be liable?'" This question
certainly looms heavily on the minds of financial institutions as well as insurance
companies and industry leaders.77 However, the Commission recognizes that
any proposal must consider how lenders and financial institutions will be
affected. 179
B. Detrimental Effects of Lender Liability
European financial institutions are concerned about the prospect of liability
for environmental damage caused by their borrowers. t0 Proponents of holding
financial institutions liable for environmental damage note that lender liability will
encourage lenders to investigate potential borrowers and their waste related
amounts to be appropriated to the Hazardous Substance Superfund). See supra note 73 (citing and discussing
Hazardous Substance Superfund).
174. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 3.0. "The cost of damage linked to the aggregate impact of a sector's
activities becomes apportioned among the individual enterprises, and thereby internalized." Id. See Napier, supra
note 4 (discussing the Green Paper's version of a joint compensation system).
175. See The European Community-Environmental Liability and the Risk for Financial Institutions, EC
FIN. SERVs. NEWSL (Clifford Chance, London), Feb. 1992, at 28-30 [hereinafter Clifford Chance] (discussing
direct and indirect lender liability). The newsletter discusses lender liability in regard to the Waste Directive.
Id. See Waste Directive, supra note 55. Discussion on the Waste Directive has been delayed pending the
development of a comprehensive environmental liability scheme. Turner T. Smith, Jr. & Roszell D. Hunter,
International Environmental Law Developments: A Focus on Europe, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 301 (1993) (stating that the proposed Civil Liability for Waste Liability Directive was
held up pending the Green Paper). See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Waste
Directive).
176. Clifford Chance, supra note 175, at 29 (discussing the dangers of taking possession of land and
retaining some power to control the business in the loan agreement). See supra notes 66-98 and accompanying
text (discussing liability of owners and operators under CERCLA).
177. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 4.1.2 (raising the unanswered issue of what shall constitute a liable
party).
178. First Clash, supra note 10 (recognizing that several industries have expressed discontent with the
Green Paper). The European chemical industry refuses to accept liability for the life of its chemical products.
Id. The BFEC wishes to avoid assuming the role of policemen of borrower activities, Id. The European Insurance
Committee explains that it cannot offer insurance until it is possible to evaluate the cost of damage. Id.
179. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 4.1.2.
180. First Clash, supra note 10 (noting that the BFEC, which represents the banking industry of the EU,
has expressed great concern about lender liability).
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activities."' In addition, proponents of lender liability argue that it is reasonable
to hold lenders liable when they profit on loans to businesses involved in waste
disposal, production, or transportation."
Despite these arguments, the BFEC fears that if banks are held liable for the
waste related activities of their borrowers, financial institutions will be required
to police the activities of potential and present borrowers. 83 Experience under
CERCLA dictates that lender liability negatively affects lending transactions."t
Consequently, businesses shoulder the cost of environmental liability in the form
of added fees, environmental property audits, and higher interest rates." 5 The
chairman of the EU Parliament's Committee on the Environment, Public Health,
and Consumer Protection stresses that lender liability is a concern in the EU.
18 6
Essentially, private investors are unwilling to invest more money to cleanup
contaminated areas. s7 Unwillingness to reinvest "is a very serious concern
because without such capital contaminated land will not be reused and will
continue to pose potential risks to [the] environment and public health."18
Another concern is that lenders will blacklist certain businesses or industries,
refusing to lend to parties engaged in environmentally risky activities. 189 As a
necessary consequence, even though Europe has not faced a precedent-setting case
on the level of Fleet Factors, financial institutions remain at risk in the EU.' 9°
Lenders may be liable for cleanup costs or pay indirectly through loss in the value
181. Quentel, Cleanup Costs, supra note 66, at 185.
182. Id. at 184. See John Gapper, Banks Face Liability for Pollution, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993 (reporting
that the British government believes banks should be responsible along with polluters and landowners).
183. First Clash, supra note 10.
184. See Cleaning Up the Debris, supra note 73, at 1257-58 (1991) (noting that lender liability may deter
hazardous waste counseling by lenders attempting to avert liability for participation in disposal decisions and
may deter entrepreneurs from investing in ventures by the cost of environmental cleanup which banks will
require before making loans); Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 93, at 23 (noting several repercussions:
Lenders become saddled with unmarketable property because the liability for cleanup is greater than the value
of the property; lenders must delay foreclosure for fear of incurring liability as an owner of damaged property;
and lenders refrain from workouts for fear of incurring liability as an operator of damaged property). See
generally Greenberg & Shaw, supra note 17, at 1211 (discussing the potential risk of liability for lending
institutions).
185. See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 93, at 23 (noting that lender liability leads to lesser
availability of loans and higher premiums); Lender Liability and How It Effects [sic) Customers' Credit Ratings,
supra note 95 (noting that businesses face added fees, higher interest rates, and environmental audits).
186. EP Committee Public Hearing on Environmental Damage, Reuter Eur. Community Rep., Nov. 4,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reueub File (discussing an address by Chairman Ken Collins at a joint
public hearing on preventing and remedying environmental damage).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. John Bryne, American Banking Association senior counsel commented, "If Fleet were upheld, [banks]
may as well blacklist firms on the EPA National Priority List and never lend to those on that list until they are
cleared of liability." Lender Liability and How it Effects [sic] Customers' Credit Ratings, supra note 95.
190. Id.
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of the security or by the decreased likelihood that a borrower will make good on
the note. 91
V. LENDING IN AN UNCERTAIN AGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EU LENDERS
The Green Paper is a harbinger to the changing climate in European
environmental legislation."9 Forthcoming environmental legislation will likely
impose liability without fault.19 Consequently, EU lenders must recognize and
prepare for the introduction of environmental, civil liability legislation. Respected
specialists have developed guidelines to assist prudent lenders and their attorneys
in minimizing the risk of environmental liability.' 94 In the United States, lenders
have a difficult time distinguishing between cautious supervision of borrower
activities and supervision sufficient to constitute participation in management
activities. 95 Prior to the adoption of the EPA regulations, case law was devoid
of consistent and clear rules outlining acceptable lender behavior making it
necessary to adhere to prophylactic strictures."9 These guidelines advise the
lender to take precautions prior to the loan, during loan negotiation, and upon
workouts and foreclosure.
191. Id. (quoting Chris Napier of Clifford Chance).
192. This Week in Europe: Aid for Britain's Jobless, supra note 3. In 1994, EU environmental policy will
focus on the development of an environmental, civil liability system. Id.
193. See supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Green Paper's recommendation of
strict environmental liability).
194. E.g., 2 GERALD L. BLANCHARD, LENDER LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE AND PREVENTION § 15I:15.50
(1989 & Supp. 1993); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Lender Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup, in LENDER LIABILITY
LAW AND LITIGATION § 12.04 (Joseph J. Norton & W. Mike Baggett eds., 1992); Louis C. DeArias & Richard
E. McCann, Financial Institutions, in ENVIRONMENTAL DIsPUTE HANDBOOK: LIABILITY AND CLAIMS §§ 13.1-
13.21 (David A. Carpenter et al. eds., 1991); Laura A. Baity & G. Robert Witmer, Jr., Minimizing Risk to the
Lender: Fleet Factors Revisited, in THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS 1990, at 375 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B4-6949, 1991); David R. Berz & Peter
M. Gillon, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: In Search of a New Deep Pocket, 108 BANKING LJ. 4, 27-29
(1991); Michael B. Kupin, supra note 92, at 214; George A. Nation III, Minimizing Risk of Loss from
Environmental Laws, 108 BANKING LJ. 346, 367-85 (1991); Thomas Redick, Life After "Fleet Factors," CAL.
LAW., Apr. 1991, at 72.
195. DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.19.
196. See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a lender must
exercise the right to participate in management in order to lose security interest exemption); United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (establishing that a capacity to influence standard for
participation in management); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md.
1986) (holding that a lender's protection under the security interest exemption terminated at foreclosure); United
States v. Mirabile, [1985] 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996 (E. Pa. 1985) (holding that a lender
did not lose the security interest exemption upon foreclosure).
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A. Investigation of Property
The most effective way for lenders to elude environmental liability is to
reduce exposure prior to loan transactions. 97 The risk of liability necessitates
the execution of environmental audits.198 Lenders should religiously conduct
environmental audits of high risk properties prior to the execution of a loan.
199
High risk properties include industrial sites; construction sites; properties
handling, using, or storing hazardous waste; and properties located near Superfund
sites or landfills.2" In order to insure against lender liability, financial institu-
tions should take full advantage of audits and refrain from financing environmen-
tally risky enterprises. 2 t Lenders should order environmental audits as early as
possible during loan negotiation in order to give the lender sufficient time to fully
evaluate the environmental risks of the loan.2 2
An environmental audit should begin by examining several sources of
information to develop an accurate site history of the secured property. 3
Initially, the lender should conduct a title examination of the property, taking
notice of any easements, leases, restrictions, as well as transfers.2°4 A review of
the named transferees will indicate how the property has been used; for example
a lessee known as the ABC Chemical Corporation may indicate the need for
further investigation. 5 The extent of the title search will vary depending on the
location and past uses of the secured property.206 Real estate located in histori-
197. BLANCHARD, supra note 194, § 15:43; DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.14. Activities
undertaken prior to a loan transaction will not constitute participation in management. 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.1 100(c)(2)(i) (1992). A lender may conduct an environmental audit or order the prospective borrower to
clean up the property without risking the loss of the security interest exemption. lIL Nonetheless, failure to
conduct an environmental audit prior to the loan transaction will not affect the lender's liability. Id. Cf. Long
Awaited Rule, supra note 118, at 10,640 (noting that preloan activities will not constitute participation in
management under the EPA rule).
198. Gaba, supra note 194, § 12.04.
199. DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.2; Gaba, supra note 194, § 12.04; Baity & Witmer, supra
note 194, at 375; Kupin, supra note 92, at 212-13; Redick, supra note 194, at 75.
200. DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.12. High risk properties also include existing or former
gas stations, automobile repair shops, dry cleaning stores, railroad yards and tracks, underground tanks and
pipelines, refuse or waste disposal sites, and improvements containing asbestos. Id.
201. Gaba, supra note 194, § 12.04.
202. Kupin, supra note 92, at 213. Often the environmental audit is received nearing the end of the lending
process. Id. The enthusiasm for the project may inhibit prudent deliberation of the audit's results. Id.
203. BLANCHARD, supra note 194, § 15.44; DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.14; Gaba, supra
note 194, § 12.04; Berz & Gillon, supra note 194, at 27-28; Kupin, supra note 92, at 212-13; Nation supra note
194, at 371-73.
204. BLANCHARD, supra note 194, § 15.44; DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.14; Quentel,
Cleanup Costs, supra note 66, at 183.
205. BLANCHARD, supra note 194, § 15.44; DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.14.
206. BLANCHARD, supra note 194, § 15.44.
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cally industrialized areas will require a more extensive examination, as will
property which has been used for environmentally risky activities. 7
In order to complete a thorough environmental audit, the lender should
conduct a visual inspection of the real estate and adjacent properties."' The
lender should also require the borrower to complete, with the assistance of
counsel when possible, an environmental questionnaire.2°9 Lenders should
employ fact specific inquiries and members of the lending team knowledgeable
in environmental law should review the responses, and investigate questionable
activities. 210 Finally, if available, the lender should obtain and diligently
examine any governmental records which would indicate past or prospective
environmental hazards.2 n
B. Negotiation of Loan Agreements
Prudent lenders should review and amend standard loan covenants to reflect
their increased awareness of environmental liability. To avoid liability on the
basis of capacity to influence, the lender should delete provisions which provide
for increased lender participation of a debtor's enterprise upon financial
deterioration of the borrower.2 12 In addition, lenders should require periodic
updates of the original environmental audit.21 These regular updates may detect
environmental problems in time to require cleanup by the borrower, move the
loan to another lender, or accelerate the loan and collect from solvent guaran-
tors.
214
Further, the lender should require that the borrower warrant proper past and
future use of the property215 and likewise indemnify the lender against any
environmental liability arising out of such use.2t6 The indemnity agreement
207. Id.
208. Id. § 15.47; DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.14.
209. BLANCHARD, supra note 194, § 15.54; Nation, supra note 194, at 368-71.
210. Nation, supra note 194, at 368-71. Lenders should refrain from using legal terminology in the
questionnaires. Id. at 370. For example, the question, "Does the corporation use hazardous substances in its
manufacturing process?" involves a determination of the legal issue of what is a hazardous substance. Id. A
better and fact specific question would be, "Has the corporation ever used polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in
its manufacturing process?" Id. This will enable the potential client to accurately answer the inquiries. Id.
211. BLANCHARD, supra note 194, § 15.45; DeArias & McCann, supra note 194; § 13.14; Quentel,
Cleanup Costs, supra 66, at 183.
212. Kupin, supra note 92, at 214. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (1990);
infra notes 79-98 and accompanying discussion. "[A] secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the
management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste
disposal decision if it so chose." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
213. BLANCHARD, supra note 194, § 15.15.50; Redick, supra note 194, at 72.
214. BLANCHARD, supra note 194, § 15.15.50.
215. DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.19; Gaba, supra note 194, § 12.04; Quentel, Cleanup
Costs, supra note 66, at 183-84.
216. DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.17; Gaba, supra note 194, § 12.04; Redick, supra note 194,
at 72; Quentel, Cleanup Costs, supra 66, at 183-84.
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should outlive the loan to shelter the lender from liability claims which arise
subsequent to the debtor's obligation but as a result of borrower activities."7 If
the borrower seeks to terminate indemnity upon sale, the lender should order an
environmental audit at that time to determine if contamination has taken
place.
218
C. Workouts and Foreclosure
After the execution of the loan document, the lender must continue to exercise
caution when managing the loan portfolio, specifically during workouts and
foreclosure.219 Whenever possible, lenders should refrain from activities which
could be characterized as participation in management.' Extra precaution
should be taken to abstain from deciding operational issues related to the use,
transportation, handling, or disposal of hazardous materials." Lending institu-
tions can guard against liability by establishing and following precepts which
restrict the lender's involvement in the management decisions of the borrow-
er. -2m All contact with the debtor should be documented to preserve evidence
of the lender's noninterference with the hazardous waste decisions of the
borrower.' Finally, before increasing involvement in debtor activities, lenders
may consider ordering an additional environmental audit report.2
4
If the potential environmental liability will outweigh the value of the
obligation, the lender should consider alternatives other than foreclosure when the
borrower defaults on loan obligations. A lender may consider acceleration of the
debt, partial foreclosure, or loan modification to avoid incurring liability.'
Ultimately, the lender may have to consider abandoning the security.226 If title
is taken at foreclosure, the lender should restrict involvement at the site and
217. DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.12; Gaba, supra note 194, § 12.04. See DeArias &
McCann, supra note 194, § 13.13 (providing a sample indemnity agreement for lenders).
218. Redick, supra note 194, at 75.
219. See supra notes 114-36 and accompanying text (discussing policing and workout activities which do
not constitute participation in management under the EPA rule).
220. Gaba, supra note 194, § 12.04. See supra notes 114-36 and accompanying text (discussing policing
and workout activities which do not constitute participation in management under the EPA rule).
221. Berz & Gillon, supra note 194, at 28.
222. Kupin, supra note 92, at 213-14; Redick, supra note 194, at 76. Loan officers should observe and
diligently follow the established lending precepts. Id.
223. Redick, supra note 194, at 76.
224. Baity & Witmer, supra note 194, at 375; Kupin, supra note 92, at 214. Lenders should consider
abandoning the loan obligation if the risk of environmental liability is greater than the value of the security.
Baity & Witmer, supra note 194, at 375.
225. DeArias & McCann, supra note 194, § 13.20.
226. Kupin, supra note 92, at 215; Baity & Witmer, supra note 194, at 375; Quentel, Cleanup Costs, supra
note 66, at 183.
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transfer the property without delay.227 Nevertheless, acquisition of the property
remains risky because polluted property is less marketable. This extends the time
period which the lender retains possession and increases the likelihood of being
characterized as participating in the management of the facility.
22
VI. CONCLUSION
As previously stated, the Commission believes that environmental, civil
liability will advance the dual goals of polluter accountability and prevention of
environmental damage.229 Civil liability implements the accountability goal by
requiring monetary compensation from polluting parties."0 Likewise, the threat
of tremendous civil liability will deter environmental damage."
The Commission advocates the use of civil liability to finance the restoration
of the environment.3 2 Understandably, European financial institutions are
worried about liability following the rise of lender liability under CERCLA. 3
However, holding lenders liable for the environmental damage of a borrower is
not consistent with the polluter should pay principle. Lenders who merely hold
a security interest in the realty or personalty of a pollution causing enterprise are
not ultimately responsible for the environmental damage. Lenders, who acquire
ownership of the property through foreclosure or agreements in lieu of foreclo-
sure, are not responsible for the production of pollution. Similarly, lenders who
become involved in management decisions in order to protect their security,
without managing hazardous waste, are not generating waste or causing
environmental damage.2 4 Lenders should not be forced to finance the cleanup
227. Gaba, supra note 194, § 12.04; Redick, supra note 194, at 76. See supra notes 129-36 and
accompanying text (discussion foreclosure and postforeclosure activities under the EPA rule).
228. Berz & Gillon, supra note 194, at 4. Lenders may incur liability during the removal and relocation
of personalty if the process triggers the release of hazardous substances. Redick, supra note 194, at 76.
229. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.0. EU Environment Commissioner loannis Paleokrassas identifies EU
goals as prevention of environmental damage and the imposition of the polluter pays principle. Paleokrassas
Outlines, supra note 36.
230. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 2.1.
231. Id. § 1.0. U.K. Environmental Minister Tim Yeo has called for recognition of Superfund achievement
in the area of deterrence of further contamination. Minister on Lenders' Responsibilities, FLIGHT INT'L, Oct.
1993.
232. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.0 (stating "a person should rectify damage that he causes"). See United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 821 F. Supp. 707,722 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (remarking that "one of CERCLA's central
tenets is to make the polluter pay"); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (1 1th Cir. 1990)
(citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 1990)) ("The
essential policy underlying CERCLA is to place the ultimate responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste on
'those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison."'). See also EEC Treaty, supra note
24, art. 130r (providing that the "polluter should pay").
233. David Lascelles, Debate Rages on liability/Review ofthe Problem of Contaminated Land, FIN. TMEs,
Dec. 22, 1993; John Gapper, supra note 182.
234. Bottomless Pit, supra note 58. Lenders are not polluters and should not have to finance the cleanup
of environmental damage caused by their borrowers. Id.
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of damage caused by defaulting borrowers 35 The foregoing reasons demon-
strate that a civil liability system which does not exclude lending institutions from
liability is inconsistent with the goal of requiring the polluter to pay.
While the Green Paper recognizes that civil liability deters environmental
damage,3 6 it fails to recognize that lender liability is inconsistent with the goal
of prevention. Placing the risk of liability on financial institutions which finance
environmentally risky industries will not deter pollution; rather, it deters lending
institutions from advancing capital to these "tagged" industries. In certain
situations this may actually hinder the prevention of environmental damage
because lenders are unwilling to finance activities needed to regenerate affected
areas. Consequently the areas will remain contaminated and unused by indus-
try.37 In lieu of incurring the risk of liability, lending institutions may also
blacklist industries which pose a liability risk for lenders.238 In either scenario,
holding lenders accountable for the activities of their capital recipients is not
consistent with the EU goal of prevention of environmental damage.239
Lender liability is inconsistent with both of the goals expounded in the Green
Paper. Holding financial institutions liable for environmental damage does not
deter pollution. It deters lenders from financing environmentally risky activities,
engaging in workouts with troubled businesses, and ultimately it deters lenders
from exercising their right to foreclose and recover on their loans. Similarly,
holding lenders liable does not compel the polluter to pay, it mandates that deep
pocket lending institutions foot the bill for irresponsible, insolvent, or absent
borrowers.
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235. See supra notes 99-136 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA clarification of the security
interest exemption, which delineates permissible management activities).
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borrowers, who in order to cut operating costs may neglect environmental compliance. Nicholson & Zuiderhoek,
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